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Abstract		The	 affective	 labour	 debate	 has	 become	mainstream	 in	 communications	 studies.	 In	 this	 paper,	 I	suggest	the	Aesthetic	Movement	of	the	late	19th	century	as	inspiration	for	how	users	can	use	Face-book	with	the	knowledge	that	their	data	 is	being	used	for	profit.	 I	present	Facebook	usage	as	art,	creating	an	analog	with	aesthete	Oscar	Wilde’s	essay,	“the	critic	as	artist”	(1891/2010),	where	he	presents	critics	as	artists.	Other	theorists,	especially	Walter	Benjamin	provide	grounding	for	mak-ing	the	argument	that	Facebook	usage	is	an	artistic	expression.	I	then	turn	to	my	inversion	of	Wal-ter	Pater’s	“art	for	art’s	sake”,	the	seminal	idea	of	Aestheticism	and	propose	Facebook	for	Facebook’s	
sake	as	a	method	for	Facebook	use.	While	more	advanced	remuneration	concepts	have	yet	to	arrive	with	such	force	that	they	could	provide	the	proper	payment	to	users,	Facebook	for	its	own	sake	is	a	way	to	appreciate	Facebook’s	beauty	in	the	meantime.	Baudelaire	and	Debord’s	psychogeographic	theories	provide	methods	 for	navigating	 cities	 that	 I	 apply	 to	 examine	Facebook	as	 a	digital	 city.	The	central	claim	of	 this	paper	 is	 the	 following:	By	using	Facebook	for	Facebook’s	sake,	users	 take	back	some	of	the	dignity	taken	away	from	them	in	the	exploitation	of	free	labour.	Finally,	I	turn	to	critiques	of	Aestheticism	and	how	contemporary	 software	might	provide	 insight	 into	using	Face-book	 in	 an	 ethical	manner.	Users	will	 have	 to	 consider	 each	 action	differently;	 how	would	 liking	something	affect	users’	artistic	expression	of	themselves?	In	this	way,	while	the	affective	labour	de-bate	continues,	users	can	use	Facebook	for	its	own	sake.	
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Introduction		In	this	paper,	I	am	proposing	a	way	of	using	Facebook	that	draws	on	the	Aesthetic	Movement	to	at-tempt	to	navigate	the	complex	realm	of	dignified	Facebook	usage.	Facebook	for	Facebook’s	sake	is	a	prescription	for	how	to	use	social	media	in	an	age	when	the	ethics	and	politics	surrounding	Face-book	usage	are	 incredibly	 complicated.	 I	 am	not	 contributing	 to	 the	debate	of	what	kind	of	work	users	may	 be	 doing	 or	 how	 their	 contributions	 should	 be	 valued	 (monetized	 value,	 social	 value,	etc.).	However,	my	ideas	are	predicated	on	the	notion	that	social	media	users	are	exploited	for	some	kind	of	value.	Educated	users	must	decide	how	to	navigate	social	media	in	an	ethical	manner.	The	Aesthetic	Movement	and	its	theorists	that	emerged	in	the	late	19th	century	inspire	my	idea	of	Face-
book	for	Facebook’s	sake.	This	is	a	usage	that	seeks	to	find	the	least	possible	sacrifice	of	uncompen-sated	affective	labour.		
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Exploitation	on	Social	Media	
	Before	defining	what	Facebook	for	Facebook’s	sake	means,	I	will	give	a	brief	summary	of	the	debate	about	exploitation	on	social	media.	This	ongoing	debate	has	many	different	proponents	and	I	will	mention	 only	 those	 helping	 to	 understand	 my	 argument.	 Wages	 for	 Facebook	 (Ptak,	 2013)	 is	 a	movement	that	demands	wages	for	the	perceived	labour	of	that	is	Facebook	usage.	This	is	based	on	the	idea	that	users	are	digital	prosumers,	namely	consumers	who	contribute	to	the	production	pro-cess.	 Wages	 for	 Facebook’s	 argument	 is	 that	 Facebook	 acquires	 value	 through	 its	 users’	 unpaid	work.	Users	interact	with	the	platform	and	their	usage	is	converted	into	profit,	a	process	I	will	de-scribe	later	on.		Christian	Fuchs’	“Labor	[sic]	in	informational	capitalism	and	on	the	Internet”	(2010),	shows	that	large	capitalist	companies,	like	social	media	companies,	exploit	their	users	for	profit.	He	draws	on	Dallas	 Smythe’s	 “audience	 commodity”	 (2002),	 the	 idea	 that	 audiences	 perform	marketing	 func-tions	 in	 a	 kind	 of	Marxist	 exploitation.	 Every	 interaction	 on	 Facebook,	 from	 clicking	 on	 an	 ad	 to	sending	a	message,	gives	Facebook	more	data	from	which	to	glean	profit.	Through	the	production	and	reproduction	of	 labour,	users	work	in	a	 liminal	space,	exploited	for	their	marketing	functions	while	using	 the	platform	for	 free.	Smythe	and	Fuchs’	 identification	of	 this	 interaction	as	 labour	 is	one	of	the	questions	in	this	debate,	but	not	one	which	I	seek	to	answer	here.	Their	idea	that	compa-nies	gain	value	from	their	users,	however,	is	hard	to	contest.	Arvidsson	and	Colleoni	(2012)	see	value	more	in	financial	terms.	Rather	than	a	lens	of	Marxist	labour,	they	adopt	a	lens	of	affective	labour.	Affective	labour	refers	to	immaterial	labour	performed	online	and	on	social	media	platforms	(Hardt,	1999).	For	Arvidsson	and	Colleoni,	the	value	created	on	platforms	like	Facebook	is	not	about	a	commodity	exchange,	but	about	the	value	that	Facebook	derives	 in	 financial	markets.	To	them,	this	 is	a	more	accurate	way	of	 thinking	about	the	value	ex-change	online,	 and	presents	 a	more	 accurate	model	 of	 informational	 capitalism.	As	 to	Arvidsson,	Bauwens,	and	Peiterson	(2008),	they	call	the	kind	of	immaterial	labour	happening	on	sites	like	Fa-cebook	 the	 ethical	 economy.	 In	 this	 economy,	 the	 immaterial	 labour	performed	online	 is	 uncom-pensated,	 creating	precarious	 employment	where	unemployed	or	underemployed	people	 are	un-paid	by	the	very	economy	they	serve.	Their	use	of	the	word	ethical	is	important	here:	it	is	not	that	exploitation	on	social	media	is	ethical,	but	that	the	word	ethical	emphasizes	the	value	logic	in	these	newer	modes	of	production.	The	source	of	value	is	an	ethical	thing	in	that	it	relies	on	communities,	shared	values,	and	affective	relationships.		This	 debate	 is	 highly	 complex	 and	 ongoing.	 From	here	 on,	 I	will	 take	 the	 stance	 that	 in	 some	manner,	Facebook	acquires	value	from	its	users’	actions	which	the	users	perform	without	financial	remuneration.	My	response	is	related	to	this	debate,	but	rather	than	finding	a	solution	for	compen-sating	Facebook	users,	I	refer	to	selected	theorists	that	offer	some	instruction	in	how	to	find	pleas-ure	in	artistic	ventures,	and	in	turn,	can	be	applied	to	Facebook	usage.	By	doing	so,	I	show	how	us-ers	can	find	meaning	through	their	technology	usage	and	maybe	take	back	some	dignity	that	may	be	lost	in	their	exploitation.	I	have	chosen	Facebook	specifically	because	it	has	become	a	kind	of	au-thoritarian	 figure	 in	discussions	 around	value	 creation	 and	exploitation	online	 (Cohen,	 2008).	As	the	largest	social	network,	 it	has	the	largest	ethical	economy	(Arvidsson,	Bauwens,	and	Peiterson,	2008),	provides	the	largest	communities,	and	a	large	volume	of	affective	relationships.	In	brief,	it	is	creating	the	largest	possibilities	for	sharing	values	and	ideas.	One	significant	way	that	social	media	usage	is	converted	into	value	is	through	algorithms.1	Mike	Ananny	writes	about	algorithms	as	Networked	Information	Algorithms	(NIAs),	which	works	for	my	concept	because	they	have	an	ethical	component.	Through	their	situated	code,	practices,	and	norms,	they	facilitate	relationships	with	people	and	data	with	their	autonomous	processes	(Ananny,	2016).	
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This	 is	 a	 similar	 concept	 to	 Arvidsson,	 Bauwens,	 and	 Peiterson’s	 (2008)	 ethics	 of	 communities,	shared	 values,	 and	 affective	 relationships	mentioned	 above.	 The	 algorithmic	 process	 Ananny	 de-scribes	 can	be	 seen	as	one	element	within	Arvidsson,	Bauwens,	 and	Peiterson’s	 ethical	 economy.	My	response	to	the	“affective	labour	debate”,	as	I	will	refer	to	it	from	now	on,	is	an	ethical	response	in	which	 algorithms	 are	 viewed	 as	 ethical	 processes,	 such	 as	 those	 in	 Arvidssons,	 Bauwens	 and	Peiterson’s	ethical	economy.	In	this	context,	part	of	the	ethical	process	is	offering	a	usage	where	the	user	 is	 sacrificing	 the	 least	 amount	of	pleasure	despite	Facebook’s	 exploitative	 actions.	The	algo-rithms	are	networked	because	they	connect	different	“actors”	(Johnson,	1988)	to	every	part	of	Fa-cebook	and	the	internet-at-large.	Facebook’s	algorithms	are	NIAs	that	decide	which	ads	to	display,	what	 comes	 up	 in	 News	 Feeds,	 and	 other	 functions	 of	 Facebook.	 Although	 the	 Facebook	 News	Feed’s	algorithm	is	commonly	referred	to	as	EdgeRank,	it	has	moved	on	from	that	system	into	a	far	more	complicated	one	(McGee,	2013).	Facebook’s	NIA	uses	machine	learning	to	make	its	decisions	based	on	approximately	100	000	different	factors	(McGee,	2013).		It	would	be	extremely	difficult	to	question	Facebook’s	NIA	as	to	why	it	makes	certain	decisions.	Frank	Pasquale	 (2015)	 argues	 that	many	algorithms,	 like	 the	ones	Facebook	uses,	 are	 inherently	unknowable.	Machine	 learning	 creates	opaque	black	boxes.	These	algorithms	perform	 their	 func-tions	and	then	create	data	which	Facebook	can	sell	for	profit.	Arvidsson	and	Colleoni	(2012)	argue	that	finding	ways	to	quantify	the	value	from	social	media	use	would	be	quite	difficult,	and	due	to	the	opacity	of	the	black	boxes,	almost	impossible.	Users	are	faced	with	the	question	of	how	to	use	Face-book	knowing	that	their	usage	may	be	exploited	for	profit.	I	suggest	looking	to	the	Aesthetic	Move-ment	as	inspiration	for	how	Facebook	might	be	used	ethically	for	pleasure.	This	differs	 from	other	approaches	 to	digital	 labour	and	exploitation	 for	a	number	of	 reasons.	The	 idea	of	digital	 labour	stems	 from	the	notion	 that	users	are,	 in	 some	manner,	being	 taken	ad-vantage	of	for	value.	Yet,	the	likelihood	of	this	issue	being	resolved	any	time	soon	is	minimal.	The	authors	mentioned	in	this	section	write	about	how	social	media	is	exploitative,	but	solutions	to	this	problem	are	difficult;	answers	are	hard	to	come	by.	If	Arvidsson	and	Colleoni’s	assumption	(2012)	is	correct	and	quantifying	this	value	is	impossible,	then	the	issue	will	never	be	resolved.	Should	the	value	somehow	be	quantified,	then	users	being	paid	out	universal	dividends	may	be	a	possible	solu-tion.	However,	that	may	or	may	not	ever	happen,	and	does	not	seem	likely	to	occur	any	time	soon.	My	 response	 to	 this	debate	 is	not	 to	delete	one’s	Facebook	account	or	 to	 stay	off	 of	 social	media	sites.	Rather,	it	is	to	use	theories	of	art,	urban	experience,	and	others	to	find	a	way	to	use	Facebook	for	maximum	pleasure.	Since	the	exploitation	issue	is	unlikely	to	be	resolved,	my	approach	intends	to	help	users	take	back	some	of	the	dignity	lost	in	exploitation	by	making	the	most	out	of	their	ex-perience	on	Facebook.	Users	are	faced	with	the	question	of	how	to	handle	themselves	knowing	that	their	every	click	is	being	tracked	(Bolin	&	Schwarz,	2015).	Users	may	be	exploited,	but	they	should	not	 let	 that	ruin	 their	experience.	Facebook	for	Facebook’s	sake	 is	 inspired	by	 the	Aesthetic	Move-ment,	which	I	will	now	turn	to	in	order	to	explain	the	meaning	of	this	statement.		
Social	Media	Use	as	Art		Oscar	Wilde,	a	prominent	Aesthetic	writer,	wrote	 “the	critic	as	artist”	 (1891/2010).	 In	 this	essay,	Wilde	sought	to	eliminate	the	binaries	of	criticism	and	fine	art.	The	essay	is	formatted	as	a	dialogue,	in	which	Wilde	makes	 the	argument	 that	 criticism	 is	beyond	 reason,	 is	 subjective,	 and	 subject	 to	analysis.	For	him,	criticism	creates	order	out	of	chaos,	much	like	fine	art.	The	essay	changed	critical	theory	by	presenting	 it	as	an	artistic	 form.	In	 light	of	Wilde’s	argument,	 I	am	looking	at	Facebook	usage	as	a	kind	of	art.	
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Walter	Benjamin’s	(1935/1969)	writings	help	to	make	this	jump.	Responding	to	Karl	Marx’s	idea	of	the	superstructure,	and	writing	about	artistic	 labour	in	photography	and	film,	Benjamin	argues	that	as	technologies	change,	we	need	to	re-evaluate	what	constitutes	art.	For	Benjamin,	works	of	art	like	photography	and	film	lose	their	auras,	or	unique	qualities,	in	the	way	that	they	are	reproduced.	When	images	are	reproduced,	they	become	less	about	art	and	more	about	copying	the	original.	De-spite	the	loss	of	aura,	to	Benjamin,	these	are	still	works	of	art,	and	one	can	find	pleasure	in	their	re-productions.		I	argue	that	Facebook	usage	has	a	Benjaminian	aura.	In	many	ways,	Facebook	use	is	the	very	def-inition	of	Benjamin’s	mechanical	reproduction.	It	is	reproducible	and	there	is	a	way	to	find	pleasure	in	it.	At	first	glance	a	‘like’	can	be	counted	as	an	identical,	quantifiable	unit	in	a	uniform	way	across	Facebook,	and	 in	 that	way	 it	 is	 reproducible.	Kylie	 Jarrett’s	 (2014)	response	develops	 this	better.	For	her,	the	‘like’	button	may	be	reproducible	in	its	quantifiable	unit,	but	what	it	represents	is	not	totally	 reproducible.	 Jarrett	 explains	 that	 the	 affective	 relationship	 that	 surpasses	 the	 quantified	data	point	is	not	reproducible	and	is	only	partly	captured	in	the	reproducible	‘like’.	Looking	at	Fa-cebook	usage	as	reproducible	art,	Jarrett’s	analysis	works	well.	To	continue	 the	analogy,	Kietzmann,	Hermkens,	McCarthy,	 and	Silvestre	 (2011)	 identify	 seven	functional	building	blocks	of	social	media:	identity,	conversations,	sharing,	presence,	relationships,	reputation,	and	groups.	 In	expressing	oneself	on	social	media,	 these	building	blocks	can	all	be	 in-herently	creative.	Online	identities	require	creative	composition	by	cultivating	these	well-thought-out	 identities.	 Even	 regular	 users	 compose	 their	 online	 identities	 through	 conscious	 and	 uncon-scious	online	decisions	(Kaplan	&	Haelein,	2010).	Conversations	are	creative:	every	word	that	a	us-er	 types	 is	a	kind	of	 creative	expression.	Choosing	which	photos,	videos,	or	 statuses	 to	share	 is	a	creative	choice.	Each	item	posted	online	is	a	part	of	the	tapestry	of	an	online	identity.	A	user’s	pres-ence,	or	the	way	the	user	shows	up	online,	is	creative.	When	a	certain	user’s	presence	is	apparent	on	a	timeline,	it	is	representative	of	user	choices.	The	way	Facebook	defines	relationships	and	the	way	users	choose	which	relationship	statuses	best	fit	a	certain	relationship	are	creative	acts.	Repu-tation,	or	the	way	people	are	perceived,	is	part	of	the	creative	cultivation	of	an	online	presence.	Fi-nally,	groups	provide	a	forum	to	express	all	of	these	creative	social	media	building	blocks	amongst	fellow	users.		The	 previous	 paragraph	 shows:	 Facebook	 users	 act	 creatively.	 Their	 created	 identities	 are	unique	and	therefore	not	reproducible.	 Just	as	Benjamin	considered	photography	and	filmmaking	as	art,	Facebook	use	can	be	rethought	of	as	art.	Unlike	his	idea	of	photography	and	filmmaking,	so-cial	media	 use	 is	 difficult	 to	 replicate.	 Its	 close	 ties	 to	 a	 user’s	 identity,	 one	 of	 Kietzmann	 et	 al.’s	building	blocks	 (2011),	make	 social	media,	 and	 specifically	Facebook,	 a	unique	expression.	Every	time	 a	 user	makes	 a	 decision	 online,	 the	 user	 is	 deliberately	 fostering	 their	 online	 expression	 of	themselves.			
Facebook	for	Facebook’s	Sake	
	If	Facebook	users	are	artists,	or	at	least	performing	some	kind	of	creative	act,	then	theory	and	criti-cism	of	art	might	be	able	to	guide	its	usage	in	a	positive	direction.	To	respond	to	user	exploitation	on	Facebook,	 the	Aesthetic	Movement	 and	other	 theorists	 offer	 some	 ideas	 of	what	 ethical	 Face-book	usage	might	look	like.	I	call	this	ethical	usage	Facebook	for	Facebook’s	sake.	This	statement	is	a	variation	of	Walter	Pater’s	(1873/2010)	“art	for	art’s	sake”,	often	cited	as	the	beginning	of	the	Aes-thetic	Movement.	Although	Pater	did	not	coin	this	term,	he	popularized	it	in	his	seminal	Studies	in	
the	History	of	the	Renaissance	(1873/2010).	Pater’s	idea	of	art	for	art’s	sake	is	a	profound	statement	that	rebelled	against	the	Victorian	style	so	prominent	at	the	time	of	his	writing.	Victorian	critics	like	
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Matthew	 Arnold	 (1865/2010)	 believed	 that	 the	 critic	 had	 a	 divine	 duty	 to	 find	 morality	 in	 art.	While	 the	Victorians	were	 concerned	with	highly	 ornamental	 and	 symbolic	 art,	 Pater	 started	 the	Aesthetic	Movement	that	suggested	art	was	about	beauty	and	finding	pleasure	in	that	beauty.	Pater	empowers	his	readers	to	find	their	own	meaning	in	art	and	challenges	the	Victorian	notion	of	imbu-ing	morality	in	every	facet	of	a	piece	of	art.	In	The	Picture	of	Dorian	Gray	(1890),	Wilde	writes	that	“All	art	is	quite	useless”	(Wilde	&	Elfenbein	2007,	p.	4).	For	the	Aesthetics,	art	exists	for	its	own	rea-son,	not	for	any	other	uses.	Facebook	may	have	a	purpose	unto	itself	as	well.	The	Aesthetic	Movement’s	rejection	of	Victorian	morality	is	important.	If	users	are	to	use	Face-book	 for	 its	own	sake,	 they	must	acknowledge	 their	exploitation.	Using	Facebook	 for	purposes	of	pleasure	is	not	an	ignorant	decision.	It	is	a	decision	to	use	Facebook	for	pleasure	despite	exploita-tion.	This	is	not	giving	in	to	the	capitalist	rule	of	a	major	platform,	but	it	can	be	seen	as	a	rebellion.	Just	 like	the	Aesthetic	Movement	responded	to	Victorian	morality,	Aesthetic	Facebook	use	is	a	re-jection	of	 the	 idea	 that	a	response	 to	exploitation	 is	needed	 immediately.	This	ethical	 response	 is	can	be	 read	as	 follows:	although	NIAs	have	exploited	 the	communities,	 values,	 and	affective	 rela-tionships	on	Facebook,	some	of	the	indignity	aroused	by	exploitation	can	be	taken	back	by	finding	the	greatest	possible	pleasure	in	Facebook	usage.	This	is	a	rebellion	on	multiple	levels.	To	begin	with,	using	Facebook	for	pleasure	is	a	rewarding	act.	The	discourses	around	the	exploitative	aspects	make	some	users	feel	guilty.	In	contrast	to	other	research	that	recommends	obfuscation,	deleting	accounts,	or	completely	swearing	off	social	media,	
Facebook	for	Facebook’s	sake	suggests	using	Facebook	in	a	way	that	seeks	beauty	is	the	least	possi-ble	 sacrifice	of	uncompensated	exploitative	 labour.	Users	 should	not	 feel	guilty	 for	 finding	 joy	on	social	media	platforms.	Rather,	they	should	relish	and	actively	seek	joy.	In	other	words,	if	users	de-cide	 to	 stop	using	Facebook,	 then	exploitative	 social	media	 companies	 like	Facebook	are	 actually	doing	even	more	harm	to	the	user,	because	they	prevent	them	from	seeking	joy.	By	finding	pleasure	on	Facebook,	users	can	take	back	some	of	the	agency	lost	in	their	uncompensated	labour.		When	the	Aesthetic	Movement	rejected	Victorian	morality,	it	made	the	statement	that	not	every	single	 action	had	 to	be	meticulously	 calculated.	By	 rejecting	Victorian	morality	 and	 consequently	the	calculation	of	individual	action,	the	Aesthetic	Movement	tried	to	show	that	there	can	be	enjoy-ment	in	art.	I	argue	that	this	also	applies	to	Facebook.	Not	enjoying	it	is	a	disservice	to	oneself.	It	is	very	difficult	for	users	to	use	the	platform	without	giving	up	their	data,	but	in	using	it	for	the	maxi-mum	amount	of	pleasure,	users	can	maximize	what	they	receive	in	an	exploitative	relationship	that	is	unlikely	to	change.	When	users	maximize	their	pleasure,	it	makes	Facebook’s	side	of	datafication	lose	agency	because	users	do	not	let	Facebook	determine	their	actions.	Even	in	Ardvidsson	and	Colleoni’s	(2012)	work	on	the	difficulties	of	translating	social	media	use	into	 quantifiable	 value,	 they	 suggest	 that	 surpluses	 from	 socially	 produced	 value	 are	 distributed	globally	based	on	as-of-yet	unestablished	affective	laws	of	value.	In	another	paper,	Ardvidsson	et	al.	(2008)	offers	scenarios	in	which	the	ethical	economy	takes	over	for	the	capitalistic	economy.	In	a	way,	Aesthetic	Facebook	use,	a	use	without	meaning	other	than	finding	beauty,	is	a	way	to	attempt	a	more	deliberate	usage	of	Facebook	before	 these	suggestions.	The	suggestions	mentioned	above	would	 require	 understanding	 and	 analysis	 of	 the	 digital	 economy	 that	 is	 far	 from	 fruition.	 Users	should	not	feel	guilt	for	using	Facebook	before	these	new	economies	are	established,	and	especially	if	 they	are	never	created	at	all.	Aesthetic	Facebook	use	suggests	 that	using	Facebook	for	pleasure	and	beauty	 is	actually	an	ethical	usage.	By	 finding	pleasure	on	social	media,	users	can	experience	some	good	on	the	platform,	despite	 the	platform’s	exploitative	actions.	To	engage	with	the	digital	art	 and	express	oneself	 in	a	pleasurable	way	 that	makes	one	benefit	 from	 the	platform	 is	 to	give	oneself	 the	dignity	and	credit	 that	 the	platform	may	not	offer.	 If	Facebook	 is	hurting	users	by	ex-ploiting	them	for	their	 labour,	then	users	finding	pleasure	in	Facebook	can	fight	back	against	that	
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negativity	with	positivity.	This	can,	in	my	opinion,	be	considered	as	part	of	the	ethical	process.	I	will	further	develop	this	argument	in	the	next	paragraphs.		
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The	Ethics	of	Aestheticism	
	The	ethics	of	Aestheticism	offers	possible	answers	for	how	Aestheticism	may	be	an	ethical	answer	to	resist	exploitation	of	free	labour.	The	Aesthetic	object	offers	a	useless	pleasure,	because	defining	it,	 and	making	 sense	 of	 it,	would	 also	 create	 a	 usage-value	 (Buchan,	 1999).	 Aesthetic	 pleasure	 is	useless	in	that	it	does	not	seek	to	accomplish	anything	other	than	itself.	In	consequence,	my	argu-ment	 is	more	of	a	stopgap	answer	 than	a	direct	answer	 to	exploitation.	 In	 the	same	way	 that	 the	Victorians	gave	rise	to	the	Aesthetic	Movement,	exploitation	on	social	media	gives	rise	to	Facebook	
for	Facebook’s	sake.	Victorianism	sought	 to	 find	 truth	 in	all	 art,	while	 the	Aesthetic	Movement	 re-jected	 the	notion	 that	 art	 had	 to	 have	 truth	 at	 all.	 In	 the	 same	way,	 I	 reject	 that	 Facebook	usage	should	have	 its	own	didactic	purpose,	 like	every	aspect	of	 the	Victorian	movement.	Rather,	using	Facebook	purely	 for	pleasure	 is	a	way	to	 find	beauty	 in	 it	without	making	a	moral	statement	that	might	affect	how	much	pleasure	a	user	actually	receives	from	the	platform.	Again,	the	exploitation	issue	exists,	so	how	should	users	conduct	themselves	online	today?		
Psychogeography	
	Up	until	this	point,	we	looked	at	creative	expressions	through	Facebook	such	as	outputting	statuses	and	pictures	and	we	argued	 that	 theses	expressions	 could	be	 considered	art.	However,	Facebook	use	that	does	not	necessarily	involve	this	kind	of	direct	expression.	To	explain	this	argument,	I	turn	to	 psychogeography.	 Pyschogeography	 designates	 the	 playful	 navigation	 of	 urban	 environments	and	is	a	good	site	for	more	information	on	using	Facebook	in	an	Aesthetic	manner.	The	two	theories	of	psychogeography	that	I	will	apply	to	Facebook	come	from	Symboliste	Aesthetic	theorist,	Charles	Baudelaire,	and	French	Marxist	situationist,	Guy	Debord.	These	psychogeographical	 theories	offer	two	methods	of	using	Facebook	for	pleasure.	In	Baudelaire’s	critical	essay,	“the	painter	of	modern	life”	(1863/2010),	he	describes	the	artist	as	the	flâneur,	an	artist	whose	perfection	is	in	joining	crowds	in	cities.	Baudelaire’s	artist	blends	in	by	joining	with	others.	“He	is	an	‘I’	with	an	insatiable	appetite	for	the	‘non-I’”,	he	writes	(1863/2010,	p.	684).	The	flâneur	is	a	window	shopper	in	Paris,	but	also	watches	people.	He	joins	the	crowd,	but	is	still	observational,	like	in	Edgar	Allan	Poe’s	1840	short	story,	“The	Man	of	the	Crowd”.	The	narrator	observes	a	crowd	and	then,	in	his	fascination	with	an	old	man,	he	follows	the	old	man	and	in	turn	joins	the	crowd.	Facebook	can	be	 constituted	as	a	 contemporary	version	of	Baudelaire’s	 crowd.	 Some	of	Kietz-mann	 et	 al.’s	 building	 blocks	 (2011)	 can	 make	 that	 connection	 through	 presence,	 sharing,	 and	groups.	Everyone	in	the	crowd	shares	their	connection	to	the	group	by	being	present.	A	flâneur	on	social	media	 is	 not	 an	 influencer	 because	 they	 blend	 into	 the	 crowd.	 This	 user	 is	 one	who	 seeks	beauty	 in	simple	 interactions	shared	with	the	masses.	The	Facebook	 flâneur	takes	part	 in	memes,	group	discussions,	and	keeps	up	with	 the	 latest	 trends	on	the	platform.	By	 joining	 the	crowd,	 the	
flâneur	expresses	himself	in	his	appetite	for	that	which	is	outside	of	himself.		This	is	part	of	the	rebellion	of	Facebook	for	Facebook’s	sake.	By	finding	the	most	pleasure	in	the	platform,	users	can	reject	the	drive	to	become	an	influencer,	someone	who	makes	themselves	the	center	of	 attention.	The	attention	 seeking	would	 contradict	 the	Aesthetic	principal	of	using	Face-book	 for	Facebook’s	sake:	seeking	attention	comes	with	moral	stances.	By	contrast,	 the	Facebook	
flâneur	can	take	Aesthetic	pleasure	in	the	mere	fact	of	being	part	of	the	crowd.	Finding	beauty	in	the	interactions	and	affective	relationships	with	online	peers	can	bring	great	pleasure.		One	possible	 counterargument	 to	 joining	 the	crowd	 is	 the	ceaseless	 identification	of	Facebook	users.	They	are	tracked	at	every	click,	producing	constant	data	traces.	This	may	seem	like	it	would	
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counter	the	idea	of	disappearing	into	the	crowd,	or	becoming	something	outside	of	oneself.	By	join-ing	the	crowd,	users	actually	reject	their	unique	digital	 footprints.	The	digital	flâneur	explores	Fa-cebook	despite	being	tracked.	By	not	allowing	the	exploitation	to	guide	his	usage	through	any	other	prescribed	methods,	the	flâneur	rebels	against	those	exploiting	his	labour.	Another	psychogeographic	 theory	that	enables	one	to	explore	Aesthetic	Facebook	use	 is	Situa-tionist	and	French	Marxist	 theorist	Guy	Debord’s	derivé	 (1956).	The	derivé	is	Debord’s	suggestion	for	rapid	movement	through	a	city.	It	is	an	unplanned	strategy	for	exploration	in	which	people	are	drawn	 by	 things	 that	 attract	 them,	 an	 example	 of	 Aesthetic	 thinking	 at	 work.	 Debord’s	 subjects	could	be	drawn	in	by	beauty,	finding	the	sights	that	are	the	most	pleasing	to	engage	with	and	look	at.	This	provides	a	fitting	framework	for	pleasureable	Facebook	usage.	Aesthetic	Facebook	use	re-quires	users	to	seek	out	what	makes	them	the	happiest.	Like	with	Baudelaire	and	Facebook,	users	can	explore	the	platform	in	the	sense	of	Debord’s	idea.	The	flâneur	represents	more	of	a	lurker	on	Facebook:	 someone	who	explores	 the	platform	without	 taking	 action	 and	participating	 in	 the	 ac-tions	 that	 communities	 deem	 pleasurable.	 The	 derivé	takes	 a	more	 active	 approach:	 deliberately	seeking	out	pleasurable	images	and	interactions	on	Facebook.	The	derivé	will	happily	click	on	any-thing	that	piques	his	interest.	Paying	no	mind	to	the	masses,	the	derivé	finds	pleasure	in	exploring	the	digital	landscape	on	a	whim.		Others	might	critique	this	argument	by	saying	Facebook’s	algorithms	shape	the	derivé’s	digital	landscape.	While	 it	 is	 true	 that	algorithms	determine	what	occurs	on	one’s	homepage,	 the	derivé,	has	full	autonomy	in	choosing	what	pleases	him.	Although	the	algorithm	is	exploitative,	in	the	long-term,	 it	uses	machine	 learning	 to	better	display	 the	most	pleasurable	 landscape	 for	 the	derivé.	In	this	way	he	might	be	able	to	better	explore	the	geography	of	his	News	Feed.	If	the	Aesthetic	Face-book	 user	 can	 find	more	 pleasure,	 they	 are	 successful.	 Like	 the	Aesthetics	 rejected	 the	 Victorian	need	to	find	morality,	the	Aesthetic	ethic	here	is	not	to	change	a	user’s	actions	based	on	finding	mo-rality.	When	the	Aesthetic	Facebook	user	finds	beauty,	the	user	takes	back	some	of	the	power	that	Facebook	may	have	taken	by	dictating	their	usage.		The	argument	 that	 rejecting	Facebook	 completely	 as	 a	more	effective	 form	of	 rebellion	 is	 fair.	However,	in	its	own	way,	refraining	from	Facebook	is	still	interacting	with	the	platform.	Nobel	Prize	winner	 J.M.	 Coetzee	 offers	 some	 insight.	 His	 novel,	Waiting	 for	 the	 Barbarians	 (1980),	 received	some	negative	attention	because	several	critics	believed	that	it	allegorized	Apartheid	without	Coet-zee	identifying	Apartheid	as	his	subject.	In	his	1986	essay,	“Into	the	Dark	Chamber”,	Coetzee	writes	a	thinly	veiled	response:	“For	the	writer	the	deeper	problem	is	not	to	allow	himself	to	be	impaled	on	 the	dilemma	proposed	by	 the	state,	namely,	either	 to	 ignore	 its	obscenities	or	else	 to	produce	representations	of	them.”	(p.	13).	For	Coetzee,	writing	about	the	transgressions	that	an	ideological	body	creates	 is	still	working	within	the	 ideology.	Rejecting	social	media	 is	still	 interacting	with	 it,	too.	Refusing	to	use	Facebook	is	making	a	decision	based	on	the	fact	that	Facebook	itself	has	dictat-ed	to	you.	By	exploring	the	psychogeography	of	Facebook,	users	can	find	more	pleasure	than	com-pletely	ignoring	the	platform.	This	is	not	to	equate	or	compare	the	South	African	Apartheid	to	Face-book’s	exploitation	of	free	labour.	Coetzee’s	argument	does,	however,	present	legitimate	reasoning	that	choosing	not	to	participate	is	still	a	choice	dictated	by	the	ideological	body	governing	participa-tion.		
Nietzsche’s	Critique	of	Aestheticism	
	There	 is	 little	 to	 no	 research	 on	 the	 connection	 between	Aestheticism	 and	 exploitation	 on	 social	media,	but	that	does	not	mean	that	Aesthetic	critiques	cannot	be	transposed	to	this	area.	To	expand	on	the	idea	of	Facebook	for	its	own	sake,	I	will	turn	to	Friedrich	Nietzsche’s	critique	of	the	Aesthetic	
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Movement	in	Twilight	of	the	Idols	(1889).	In	section	twenty-four	of	the	chapter	entitled	“Skirmishes	of	an	Untimely	Man”	Nietzsche	rebukes	Aestheticism.	After	Pater	describes	his,	“L’art	pour	l’art,”	as	a	fight	against	morality’s	tendency	to	create	prejudice,	Nietzsche	makes	the	argument	that	Aestheti-cism	 creates	 its	 own	kind	of	 prejudices.	 For	 him,	 if	 Aestheticism	 is	 searching	 for	 beauty,	 relative	beauty	will	create	something	ugly.	This	is	not	a	Victorian	critique.	Nietzsche	does	not	vindicate	art	without	morality,	the	art	of	Aestheticism,	as	lacking	virtue.	Rather,	he	is	arguing	that	the	same	mor-al	divisions	that	Victorianism	created	are	also	created	in	Aestheticism.	If	everyone	is	seeking	pleas-ure	and	beauty,	then	users	are	going	to	be	divided	into	groups	that	determine	the	users’	worth	on	social	media.	In	Nietzsche’s	thinking,	the	exploitation	of	affective	labour	would	be	replaced	with	the	unfair	and	subjective	demarcation	between	what	 is	beautiful	and	what	 is	not.	For	Aesthetic	Face-book	use	to	search	for	beauty,	it	might	have	to	demarcate	what	is	ugly	as	well.	Nietzsche	would	not	say	that	this	is	a	problem,	but	a	symptom	of	Aestheticism.	To	avoid	this	dilemma,	Aesthetic	Facebook	usage	will	have	to	be	more	about	finding	pleasure	in	one’s	own	outputs	than	how	other	people	are	interacting	with	the	platform.	The	most	important	of	Kietzmann	et	al.’s	(2011)	building	blocks	is	identity.	If	users’	expressions	of	themselves	have	auras	that	cannot	be	duplicated,	then	no	one	will	be	able	to	compete	with	a	user	for	the	expression	of	that	user’s	identity.	Nietzsche’s	criticism	of	Aestheticism	highlighting	that	which	is	unappealing	will	be	avoided	because	users	inspired	by	Aestheticism	will	be	focusing	on	themselves	and	not	competing	with	others.		This	response	to	Nietzsche’s	critique	may	create	some	issues	with	the	psychogeographical	theo-ries.	If	finding	pleasure	in	one’s	own	outputs	works,	then	users	would	not	be	able	to	interact	with	other	people.	Specifically,	with	the	case	of	 the	 flâneur,	users	would	not	be	able	to	 join	a	crowd	or	community	because	they	would	be	focused	on	themselves.	This	critique	might	stop	participation	in	Facebook	at	all.	By	 its	very	nature,	Facebook	 involves	 interacting	with	other	people.	A	distinction	needs	to	be	made	between	rejecting	the	idea	of	a	competitive	landscape	and	rejecting	Facebook	al-together.	Facebook	for	Facebook’s	sake	 rejects	 the	notion	 that	a	user	has	 to	be	an	 influencer	or	 to	acquire	 some	kind	of	 social	 value	 in	an	economy	of	 reputation.	 In	 reality,	 interacting	with	others	does	not	have	to	mean	competing	with	them.	If	users	recognizing	their	own	Facebook	usage	or	in-teractions	as	ugly,	they	can	learn	to	rectify	them.		
The	Facebook	Demetricator	
	If	 searching	 for	 beauty	 creates	 its	 opposite,	 as	Nietzsche	 suggests,	 then	 there	 is	 another	 solution	that	might	allow	users	to	interact	with	Facebook	in	a	way	that	limits	social	comparisons,	while	still	allowing	users	to	explore	the	platform	with	the	psychogeographical	frameworks	in	mind.	Users	on	Facebook	can	‘like’	a	post:	the	way	in	which	beauty	might	be	quantified	is	through	how	many	likes	a	post	receives.	Someone	might	feel	disliked,	or	even	ugly,	by	comparing	the	low	number	of	likes	on	their	profile	picture	to	the	high	number	of	likes	on	someone	else’s	profile	picture.	One	solution	to	the	 problem	might	 be	 by	 using	 Ben	 Grosser’s	 Facebook	 Demetricator	 (2016).	 The	 Facebook	 De-metricator	is	a	free,	open-source	browser	extension	that	removes	numbers	from	Facebook.	It	does	not	remove	numbers	from	messages	or	other	user	inputs,	but	only	from	places	where	Facebook	in-serts	 the	metrics.	For	example,	 instead	of	a	status	saying,	 “16	people	 like	this”,	 it	will	say	“People	like	this”	(Grosser,	2016).	Grosser’s	Demetricator	removes	the	biggest	area	of	relative	comparison	on	 Facebook.	 If	 users	 seek	 beauty,	 they	 can	 do	 so	without	worrying	 about	 any	 comparisons	 be-tween	what	they	are	expressing	versus	what	other	people	are	expressing.	Without	its	metrics,	Fa-cebook	can	become	a	site	 for	seeking	out	pleasure.	Since	gaining	pleasure	from	the	metrics	 is	 too	rooted	in	comparison	to	others	to	work	with	this	usage,	interactions	only	become	more	meaningful	
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if	users	base	their	actions	and	explorations	on	the	platform	on	what	they	really	think,	rather	than	on	an	attempt	to	be	a	better	user	than	the	next	person.		By	creating	the	Demetricator,	Grosser	wanted	to	explore	Facebook	without	its	metrics.	He	is	in-terested	in	how	the	visible	metrics,	on	a	site	that	depends	on	its	users’	free	labour,	are	important	to	success.	Grosser	(2016)	asks	what	happens	when	quality,	not	quantity	is	foremost.	His	browser	ex-tension	is	partially	a	response	to	the	affective	labour	debate.	Using	the	Facebook	Demetricator	is	an	effective	way	to	use	Facebook	for	its	own	sake	while	avoiding	the	creation	of	the	ugly	that	Nietzsche	thought	Aestheticism	promotes.	A	user	can	still	join	a	crowd,	as	a	Facebook	flâneur,	because	objects	on	Facebook	will	 still	 say	 “people”,	but	 the	user	will	not	know	how	many	people	 like	 that	object.	This	can	lead	to	a	more	reflexive	use	of	Facebook:	users	might	have	to	rethink	what	kind	of	crowd	they	want	to	join,	because	each	action	can	be	considered	differently	based	on	how	it	affects	the	us-ers’	artistic	expression	of	himself	or	herself.	Using	 the	Demetricator	also	helps	users	 to	avoid	 the	draw	to	become	an	influencer.	Bolin	and	Schwarz	(2015)	call	this	the	metricated	mindset,	a	mindset	in	which	 the	metrics	displayed	on	 screen	privilege	 certain	 actions	 and	punish	others.	 Part	 of	 the	power	that	influencers	acquire	is	in	their	greater	number	of	followers	and	interactions	than	other	users.	Taking	the	metricated	mindset	out	of	Facebook	makes	it	more	pleasurable	for	other	users.			
Acknowledging	Exploitation		
Faceook	for	Facebook’s	Sake	is	positive	 thinking:	 it	 implies	 that	 although	exploitation	 is	occurring,	there	is	no	reason	to	stop	using	the	platform.	One	could	argue	that	using	Facebook	for	pleasure	is	exactly	 what	 Facebook	 wants	 users	 to	 do.	 In	 fact,	 Facebook	 does	 not	 want	 ad-blockers,	 virtual-private-networks,	 and	 obfuscation	 damaging	 their	 data,	 but	 it	wants	 users	 to	 interact	with	 their	sites	as	they	would	if	they	did	not	know	that	Facebook	converts	digital	labour	into	profit.		Nothing	 prescribed	 here	 says	 that	 users	 should	 not	 be	 informed	 about	 Facebook’s	 exploitive	methods.	Rather,	the	informed	user	can	still	consciously	use	Facebook.	While	it	is	true	that	when	a	user	intentionally	subverts	Facebook’s	data,	Facebook	is	influencing	his	or	her	actions,	as	Coetzee’s	example	 shows,	 Facebook’s	 business	 goals	 do	 not	 have	 to	 contradict	 what	 gives	 users	 pleasure.	Perhaps	 the	 relationship	 is	 not	 as	 antagonistic	 as	 it	 has	 been	 portrayed.	 Indeed,	 in	 exchange	 for	beauty-centered	 Facebook	 usage,	 Facebook’s	 algorithm	 can	 provide	 information	 that	 gives	 users	pleasure.	In	return,	Facebook	can	have	targeted	advertisin	to	capitalize	through	exploitation	of	free	labour.	 In	 the	 age	 of	 Big	 Data	 and	 individualized	 digital	 footprints,	 this	 transaction	 could	 be	 the	price	that	one	must	pay	to	reap	the	pleasures	of	Facebook.	This	 is	one	of	 the	central	questions	of	this	usage:	if	users	know	they	are	being	exploited,	are	they	willing	to	fight	back	by	finding	pleasure	on	social	media?	Coté	and	Prybus	(2007)	argue	that	 it	 is	 the	digital	 labour	on	Facebook	that	pro-duces	 the	 capital	 relationship.	 I	 argue	 that	 by	 using	 Facebook	 for	 pleasure,	 users	 can	 take	 back	some	of	Facebook’s	dominance	 in	 this	 relationship.	Exploitation	on	social	media	 is	not	 fair,	but	 it	may	be	a	necessary	evil	of	the	21st	century’s	internet	landscape.		As	Bolin	 and	 Schwarz	 (2015)	put	 it,	 once	 algorithms	have	 collected	 the	users’	 data,	 there	 is	 a	need	to	translate	the	latter	back	into	traditional	social	parameters,	parameters	that	can	be	convert-ed	 into	an	actionable	query.	 If	 social	media	 companies	 like	Facebook	have	 to	 translate	 their	data	into	a	way	to	understand	people	based	on	certain	social	parameters,	using	Facebook	for	purely	Aes-thetic	purposes	is	not	identifiable	as	any	kind	of	recognizable	usage.	Using	Facebook	for	no	reason	other	 than	 itself	 could	make	 it	 incredibly	difficult	 for	Facebook	 to	actually	 identify	a	user’s	goals:	pleasure	seeking	Aesthetic	is	not	a	traditional	social	parameter.		This	data	is	not	even	anthropomorphic.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	Facebook’s	data	is	a	series	of	num-bers	and	accumulated	traces	describing	the	users’	actions	(Haggerty	&	Ericson,	2000).	They	are	a	
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failed	attempt	at	commodified	humanity:	users	can	take	back	agency	and	humanity	by	finding	beau-ty	 in	 their	 interactions	with	 other	 users,	 as	 Facebook	 cannot	 turn	data	 into	 accurate	 representa-tions	of	humanity.		
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The	Aesthetic	Candle	
	Using	 the	Aesthetic	Movement	as	 inspiration	 for	 social	media	use	 is	useful,	but	 it	 is	 important	 to	recognize	some	limits.	I	am	not	saying	that	users	should	live	fully	Aesthetic	lives,	but	I	am	suggest-ing	that	in	these	theories	there	is	some	instruction	on	how	to	find	pleasure	in	artistic	ventures,	and	that	pleasure	can	be	 found	 in	Facebook	usage.	Through	 that	pleasure,	users	can	 find	meaning,	as	Pater	 intended	in	his	criticism	of	art.	While	not	all	 the	theorists	are	pure	Aesthetic	thinkers,	 their	theories	help	to	support	the	idea	of	Facebook	for	Facebook’s	sake,	which	is	a	direct	tribute	to	art	for	art’s	sake,	the	mantra	of	the	Aesthetic	Movement.		Ending	the	affective	labour	issue	is	complex.	Arvidsson	and	Colleoni’s	(2012)	economy	of	the	fu-ture	is	a	fruitful	starting	point	because	users	could	be	reimbursed	for	their	labour,	but	it	still	seems	to	 be	 incredibly	 hard	 to	 distribute	 the	 excess	 wealth	 that	 social	 media	 generates	 to	 its	 users.	 It	would	require	advanced	technology,	which	would	 instantly	remunerate	users	based	on	automati-cally	processed	 interactions.	This	 text	proposes	an	 immediate	solution,	while	researchers	are	still	working	on	answers	to	the	labour	debate.	It	suggests	that	users	should	not	quit	Facebook,	but	ra-ther,	use	their	informed	positions	to	employ	a	usage	that	seeks	the	most	possible	pleasure.	In	Bau-delaire’s	poem,	“damned	woman”	in	Fleurs	de	Mal,	he	begins	by	describing	the	scene,	“In	the	pallid	light	of	languishing	lamps”	(1857/1952).	The	light	burning	out	in	a	candle	is	an	image	of	the	Aes-thetic	Movement;	the	candle	will	burn	out,	so	it	is	worth	appreciating	while	it	exists.	The	candle	also	represents	every	human	life.	As	the	candles	of	our	lives	burn,	Facebook	and	other	social	media	can	be	used	to	explore	meaningful	and	beautiful	interactions.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	I	argue	that	users	can	take	back	some	of	the	dignity	that	may	be	taken	away	in	the	exploitation	of	affective	labour,	at	least	until	a	more	permanent	and	fair	solution	can	be	devised	so	that	users	are	no	longer	exploited	for	their	free	labour.			
Notes		1.	The	media	architecture	of	Facebook	is	certainly	more	complicated	than	this.	Yet,	this	dis-cussion	would	go	beyond	the	scope	of	the	paper.		
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